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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and 
International Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored by 
the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly organized 
by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas. Academic economists and researchers 
from central banks and international organizations presented and discussed current 
research, and reviewed and assessed the past experience with, and the future 
challenges of, international currency arrangements. A number of papers and the 
contributions by the discussants presented at this workshop are being made 
available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the Bank of Greece 
and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will be published in the 
journal,  International Economics and Economic Policy. Here we present the 
second of these papers. (The first was issued as Bank of Greece Working Paper 
No. 39.) In addition to the paper by Sven Arndt, the Working Paper also contains 
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 REGIONAL CURRENCY ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTH AMERICA 
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  Currency arrangements in North America have varied over the decades, during which 
both Canada and Mexico have experimented with fixed and flexible exchange rates.  Mexico has 
suffered full-blown exchange-rate crises, while Canada has not.  Both have had to deal with a 
neighbor, who dominates economic relations and economic conditions in the region. 
  Steps have been taken in North America in recent years to enhance economic cooperation, 
but the focus has been on trade rather than monetary relations.   A decade after the introduction 
of  NAFTA, a new debate is underway over its achievements and shortcomings. Projects under 
discussion include rewriting the rules of origin, deepening real-sector integration in the direction 
of customs union, and greater monetary cooperation, including both unilateral or cooperative 
currency union.  The debate is most animated in Canada and least in the United States. 
  During such debates, whether in North America or South-East Asia, questions inevitably 
arise about the lessons to be learned from the European experience.  It is by now fairly clear, that 
while Europe offers useful lessons, both positive and negative, the North American situation 
differs from Europe in several important respects.  One is the extreme imbalance in economic 
size among countries; a second involves the much greater diversity in the degree of economic 
development among the partners; and a third pertains to the relative importance in trade and 
regional economic activity of cross-border production sharing and production networks.  These 
differences have implications not only for the available policy choices in North America, but for 
the relevance of some of the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria.   2
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the main arguments 
pertaining to the choice of currency arrangements.  Section 3 considers several key implications 
of the recent experience.  Section 4 examines production networking in the region and its 
implications for the relevance of the OCA perspective.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Key Issues in the Debate
1 
  The theoretical issues relevant to currency arrangements have been debated since the 
early contributions by Mundell (1963), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969).  In the early days, 
the focus was more on goods and services markets, than on financial sectors, reflecting in part 
the fact that European capital markets were just becoming unfettered from capital controls.  The 
background of relatively high MFN tariffs and limited integration of financial markets, affected 
the magnitude of the costs and benefits to be expected from regional integration, including 
regional monetary integration.  
  Since then, huge strides have been made in the multilateral reduction of barriers to trade, 
FDI and financial flows.   Further, technical innovations have brought about substantial 
reductions in communication and transportation costs.  Together, these developments have 
allowed goods, services, and asset markets to become more closely linked, for shocks to travel 
faster, and for adjustment processes to spill over national borders.  The result has been that 
market integration has often raced ahead of inter-governmental coordination of regulatory and 
other policies.  Financial institutions, for example, have been able increasingly to cross borders 
and hence jurisdictions, while agreement on who should monitor and regulate them is yet to be 
achieved.
2       3
  The cornerstone criteria for successful monetary union are well-known and will not be 
discussed in detail here.  Suffice it to recall the basic argument, which is that in the presence of 
significant asymmetries among countries, loss of floating exchange rates will force adjustment 
onto variables like wages, prices, employment and output.  To minimize politically unpopular 
adjustment patterns, considerations based on Mundell (1963) call for cross-border factor mobility.  
Considerations based on McKinnon (1963) suggest that very open economies make better 
candidates for currency union, especially if they are major trading partners.  As the subsequent 
debate has pointed out, whether trade raises or reduces asymmetries among countries depends at 
least in part on whether it is mainly inter- or intra-industry in nature.
3 
  Kenen (1969) adds diversity as a criterion, suggesting that economies with diversified 
production and trade structures are likely to be better candidates for monetary integration, 
because shocks are likely to be more diversified in nature and more diversifiable in terms of 
impact. 
  An important feature of the original OCA arguments was their focus on the real side of 
the economy.  As the debate has evolved and inter-country financial linkages have grown, 
concerns about financial adjustment and financial stability have come to the fore, particularly in 
policy arrangements involving developing economies, whose financial sectors, though very open, 
tend to be relatively underdeveloped and fragile.
4   This is relevant to North America, where 
economic development among the three countries ranges from highly developed to emerging, 
thus requiring policies to bridge much larger gaps than existed in the original European 
arrangements.   When it comes to monetary union, the differences in terms of financial sector 
development are also much larger than among the countries which formed the EMU.  The United 
States and Canada are financially mature and integrated into the world economy, while Mexico’s   4
financial system, though linked to the United States, is relatively immature and burdened by 
“original sin” and “fear of floating.”    
  The conclusion to be drawn from the contemporary discussion is that North America is 
less than fully, but nevertheless substantially ready for closer monetary cooperation.  There is 
significant market integration among the three countries; wages and prices are quite flexible, and 
there is considerable cross-border factor mobility.   
While factor mobility was important in Mundell’s original assessment, there has always 
been a question of adjustment speeds to changes in exchange rates, on the one hand, and 
responses involving the relocation of labor and capital, on the other.  In contemporary North 
America, prices and wages are less sticky than in Europe and labor and capital are more mobile.  
Prices and wages are more market-driven.  Capital is freely mobile among the three countries.   
Skilled labor is mobile into the United States, especially from Canada, a fact which gives rise to 
concerns about “brain drain” in that country.  Unskilled labor is also mobile, at least from 
Mexico to the United States.    
  The question, nevertheless, is how useful an adjustment mechanism such factor 
movements provide, particularly in the short run.  Compared to the guest-worker programs 
adopted by many European countries in the sixties and seventies, which appeared to possess 
considerable short-run flexibility, cross-border labor movements in North America would be 
expected to be slower and thus offer somewhat more promise as a vehicle for long-run structural 
rather than shorter-run cyclical adjustment.  It is not easy to make a case for factor mobility as an 
efficient alternative to exchange-rate based responses, which brings the discussion back to the 
seriousness of asymmetries.  This question is taken up in Section 3.   5
  The three economies of North America are each other’s major trading partners and the 
small economies are also quite open.  Chart 1 shows the evolution of Canada’s and Mexico’s 
trade with the United States.  Both ratios grew rapidly during the last two decades of the 20
th 
century, peaked at the end of the century, and have been declining since.  Chart 2 gives a slightly 
different perspective, focusing on the development of regional trade in manufacturing among the 
three NAFTA countries.  It is important to note the decline since the late 1990s in intra-NAFTA  
imports, a decline that is particularly pronounced for the U.S. and Mexico.  Overall, however, the 
behavior of intra-regional trade underscores the continuing integration of the region’s economies.   
   













Source: UN Comtrade   6
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Kenen’s diversity criterion is the most problematic and ambiguous of the three.  Diversity 
is deemed to be desirable because it makes the economy less vulnerable to shocks in particular 
sectors or industries.  If diversified industries are subject to different types of disturbances, the 
negative shocks originating in any one sector may be counter-balanced by positive shocks in 
others.  To the extent that factor mobility is needed to facilitate adjustment, it takes place within 
the country, where labor mobility among sectors and regions is often higher than across borders.  
That would be true of the U.S. and Canada, for example.   
While it is certainly true that the U.S. and Canada, in particular, are diversified in terms 
of the variety of goods and services that are produced, consumed and traded in the overall 
economy, there is considerable regional concentration of many of these activities, which reduces   7
the diversity within regions relative to diversity in the country overall.  This is easily seen in the 
concentration of manufacturing in Eastern Canada, and especially Ontario, and the concentration 
of agriculture and mining in the Western provinces.  These regional differences are replicated in 
the United States.  In Mexico, too, much manufacturing is located in the Northern states, 
particularly in the maquiladora sector and in other activities catering to the U.S. market.  These 
inter-regional asymmetries have long been of concern to analysts, some of whom have suggested 
that instead of a horizontal division, the continent should have been divided vertically into two 
currency unions.  
As the debate has evolved over the years, increasing attention has been paid to the role of 
capital mobility.  The arguments are familiar.  The key feature relevant to the current discussion 
are the conclusions pertaining to monetary policy sovereignty.  This is a hot issue in Canada, as 
well as Mexico.  Both theory and the empirical evidence suggest, that in the presence of high 
capital mobility small countries lose their ability to run independent monetary policies under 
fixed exchange rates.   
  This has been a topic of considerable discussion in Canada, where the central bank’s 
economists, in particular Murray (2000), have defended floating rates.  While there have been 
periods during which Canadian monetary policy appeared to follow U.S. policy, there have been 
significant policy differences between the two countries in recent years.   Along with many other 
central banks, the Bank of Canada has pursued an explicit inflation-targeting policy and has 
shown considerable tolerance for significant movements of the exchange rate against the U.S. 
dollar.  (See Chart 3 below.)  A similar approach has been pursued by the Bank of Mexico.  As 
we shall see below, the substantial depreciation of the Canadian dollar against its U.S. 
counterpart in the 1990s has been attacked for undermining growth in high-tech industries.   8
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  The recent OCA debate has viewed fixed exchange rates - including dollarization and 
currency union with a low-inflation country - as a way for inflation-prone countries to import 
price stability.  As Chart 3 shows, this is not an issue in Canada, where monetary policy has 
succeeded admirably in maintaining low inflation rates.  Indeed, the ratio of Canada’s CPI (WPI) 
to that of the United States has been falling since the early nineties.   
  As Chart 4 shows, however, inflation in Mexico has been rising relative to both Canada 
and the United States.  It has been rising as well in relation to some third-country competitors, 
which has helped erode Mexico’s share in U.S. markets, and it is part of the explanation of the 
relative fall in intra-regional trade, noted in Charts 1 and 2.   9
  In recent years, the discussion of alternative exchange-rate regimes has voiced concerns 
about the viability of soft pegs for emerging economies.  This argument may be of relevance to 
Mexico, but not to Canada.  Both Canada and Mexico have experimented with fixed rate systems, 
but only Mexico has experienced exchange-rate crises.  Canada carries considerable amounts of 
foreign-currency denominated debt and has run sizeable current account deficits, but these have 
not provoked crises.      
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Lessons from Europe 
  There are two sets of lessons to be learned from Europe.  One concerns the way Europe 
approached monetary unification, particularly with respect to sequencing of trade, financial and 
monetary integration and the gradual deepening of integration towards EMU.  The second   10
pertains to experience since inception of EMU, particularly with respect to the viability of the 
Maastricht criteria and the efficacy of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
  With respect to sequencing, the question is whether trade liberalization and creation of a 
common and single market must necessarily precede monetary integration or whether the latter 
might at some point be introduced in order to facilitate further real-sector integration.  In other 
words, have real- and financial-sector integration and reduction of asymmetries proceeded far 
enough in North America to make monetary integration a viable option, particularly if it can 
become a catalyst for further real integration?  There is widespread concern that NAFTA has 
been deficient in a number of ways, that the benefits it has delivered have fallen short of 
expectations, while costs have been larger than anticipated, all of which suggests to some that the 
agreement is in need of significant revision.  There is evidence, for example, that the dispute 
settlement system is not working as expected and that compliance with rules of origin is so costly 
and burdensome that it is causing significant amounts of trade to by-pass NAFTA altogether.
5      
  If the European approach to sequencing is the relevant model, then further initiatives in 
pursuit of deeper real-sector integration are in order.  These would include movement toward a 
customs union and greater harmonization of regulatory, competition and dispute-settlement 
procedures.  These would be followed by a gradual shift toward fixed rates, in the manner of the 
European Monetary System (EMS).  If, however, the U.S. proves unwilling to proceed in a 
coordinated manner, then Canada and Mexico could elect to unilaterally or jointly fix to the U.S. 
dollar and bring their policies and practices into conformity with the new regime.         
  The second lesson to be learned, concerns Europe’s experience with monetary union 
since the introduction of the Euro.  Have the various OCA concerns raised in the preceding pages 
been an issue?  Have asymmetries interfered with monetary policy at the ECB level?  How   11
important is the fiscal indiscipline issue?  Are countries violating the SGP’s limits because they 
are not getting the monetary policy they need?   Are the Maastricht conditions appropriate for 
North America?    To what extent would the United States be willing to share control over 
monetary policy?   To what extent would the United States allow itself to be bound by a Stability 
and Growth Pact?  What would be the consequences if the U.S. violated the conditions of such a 
pact?   More generally, what are the implications for the common welfare of policy indiscipline 
in large member countries?  Conversely, what are the implications for individual countries of 
policy constraints imposed by the group?     
   
Can Europe Learn from North America? 
  In North America, cross-border production sharing has played an important role from the 
outset of regional integration.  Europe, on the other hand, is just now entering a phase of 
deepening by means of production sharing.   As Chart 5 shows, the Europe-15 group of countries 
has gone through “de-regionalization” since the early nineties as the share of intra-group trade 
has fallen relative to total trade.  Chart 6 provides the explanation: much of the growth in the 
group’s trade has been with the recently admitted members (and a good portion of that has 
involved production sharing).   12
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   13
3.  New Perspectives on an Old Problem 
  During the 1990s, the Canadian dollar depreciated against its U.S. counterpart.  (See 
Chart 3 above.)  It has recently recovered part of that lost value.  Among Canadian observers, the 
sustained “undervaluation” of the currency has raised concerns about its effects on Canada’s 
longer-run competitiveness.  The argument may be stated as follows.    
  The sustained depreciation of the Canadian dollar has provided an important measure of 
protection to a variety of Canadian industries facing foreign competition.  These include the 
resource-based industries, which suffered from depressed world prices of raw materials.  The 
decline of the value of the home currency, gave these industries room to raise prices and wages, 
without suffering the competitive consequences that would have manifested themselves under 
fixed rates.  Analogous competitive shelter was provided to non-resource based industries, many 
of them in the so-called “old manufacturing” sector, where they enjoyed a measure of protection 
from competition from emerging economies.   
  While this may have enabled these industries to sustain higher levels of activity than 
would otherwise have been possible, it also implies that the Canadian economy overall failed to 
move scarce productive resources into newer, more technologically advanced manufacturing.  
The weak Canadian dollar also raised the cost of imported technology, on which Canada relies 
heavily. In this sense, exchange-rate policy provided shelter to existing sectors at the expense of 
more modernization.  This argument has been vigorously pushed by economists like Courchene 
and Harris (2000), and just as vigorously rejected by others, including economists at the Bank of 
Canada.     
  The evidence does not provide support for this argument; and even if it did, it may 
merely suggest, as McCallum (1999, 2000) has noted, that Canada needs a stronger dollar and   14
not that it needs monetary union with the United States.  What is, nevertheless, interesting about 
this argument is the importance it attaches to the role of the exchange rate in stimulating 
economic growth.
6   
  In the course of this debate, economists at the Bank of Canada have steadfastly supported 
floating rates.
7  They have based the argument on the importance of the buffer function of 
flexible exchange rates.  They have claimed on the basis of econometric modeling that the 
behavior of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar can be adequately explained in rather 
traditional ways.
8  They have also disputed another argument sometimes used in support of 
official unilateral dollarization, namely, the assertion that a significant amount of de facto 
dollarization already exists.  Murray and Powell (2003) argue that while the U.S. dollar 
circulates alongside the Canadian dollar, especially in border areas, and is used in certain types 
of activities, there is no evidence of creeping dollarization.   
  A key element in the Canadian debate, and in Mexico as well, is the political dimension.  
A broad segment of Canadian public opinion is concerned about the loss of national identity.  In 
the presence of Canadian anxieties about U.S. cultural and economic dominance, the economist’s 
efficiency and cost/benefit arguments are puny by comparison.  In view of the indifference 
toward coordinated approaches in Washington, the prospects for monetary integration are dim.  
  The situation is somewhat similar, but also somewhat different in Mexico, where 
analogous anxieties about the Big Gorilla in the north exist, but where domestic institutions and 
policy discipline may be too frail for a go-it-alone strategy.  While the quality of monetary policy 
has improved sharply in Mexico, the political environment is still too fragile to ensure continuity 
of policy discipline.  There may thus be a case for a unilateral fixed-rate policy with the dollar in 
order to “lock in” certain policy reforms, provided that a political agreement to abide by the   15
constraints on domestic policy independence can be reached.  It is not clear that the current 
political environment in Mexico can generate such a consensus.
9            
 
4. Evolving Economic Structure 
  In this section we consider a feature of North American economic integration that 
distinguishes it from the original European experience, although much less from the situation 
since the most recent EU enlargement.  This is the growing importance of cross-border 
production sharing across a range of industries.  In the North American automobile sector, for 
example, parts and components made in the U.S. are assembled in Mexico into finished products 
and then exported to the U.S.  In the same sector, production sharing is so intense between the 
United States and Canada, that special vehicles ferry automobiles at various stages of completion 
back and forth across a bridge between Detroit and Windsor.  Similar multiple shuttling takes 
place in the furniture industry between Southern California and North-Western Mexico. 
  Production sharing began decades ago between the United States and Canada in the 
original auto pact.  It was followed by the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement (CUSFTA) and then 
by NAFTA.  Before NAFTA, the maquiladora program gave impetus to cross-border 
coordination of manufacturing activities between the United States and Mexico.    
  The trade flows generated by production sharing represent a new form of intra-industry 
trade.  In Europe, trade among the countries of the EEC and EFTA was “intra-industry” in nature, 
but it was characterized by two-directional flows of “varieties” of finished products. Peugeots 
went from France to Germany, while Mercedes vehicles moved in the opposite direction. 
Production sharing adds a new dimension to intra-industry trade.    16
  Production sharing has a number of implications.  In the context of a preferential trade 
area, it improves the odds that a given PTA will be net trade-creating rather than trade-diverting 
(Arndt 2001).  If a preferential trade arrangement is introduced where production sharing takes 
place with non-members, rules of origin tend to be welfare-reducing.  Indeed, as noted, recent 
evidence suggests that compliance costs with NAFTA’s rules of origin are so onerous, that a 
significant share of North America’s cross-border trade avoids NAFTA and pays the MFN tariff.   
  Cross-border production sharing also has implications for the choice of monetary 
arrangements.  It tends to support convergence and synchronization of business cycles and it 
affects the relationship between trade flows and exchange rates, as well as other variables in the 
traditional trade equation. 
  In a number of industries, specialization around the world has been pushed down from 
the level of end products to that of components and constituent activities.  In the auto sector, for 
example, parts and components made in the U.S. are shipped to Mexico for assembly into 
finished passenger vehicles, most of which are then exported to the United States.  Similar 
developments are taking place in electronics, machinery, textiles and apparel and furniture.  
This type of intra-industry (intra-product) trade tends to reduce asymmetries between 
trading partners, certainly at the level of industries and sectors and possibly at economy-wide 
levels.  Industry-specific shocks now affect production in all participating countries.  If cross-
border linkages occur across a broad range of industries, then the effect of production networks 
will foster cyclical convergence at the level of the aggregate economy. 
      17
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Source: UN Comtrade   18
 
It is, of course, possible that production sharing may be limited to particular sectors, in 
which case the reduction in asymmetries across borders in that sector, may be accompanied by 
greater asymmetries between that sector and the rest of the economy.  In Canada, for example, 
this could contribute to a further widening of the gap between cycles in the Western and Eastern 
provinces.  If industries concentrated in the province of Ontario engage in production sharing 
with their Eastern U.S. counterparts, or if industries located in the northern states of Mexico 
become more closely involved in production networks with U.S. firms, then this may widen 
asymmetries between such regions and other regions within their economies.  The evidence to 
date suggests that production networks are contributing to convergence of business cycles.
10   
(See Charts 7 and 8.) 
  As noted, production networks affect the relationship between trade flows and exchange 
rates, relative prices and incomes.  They introduce a new direct relationship between exports and 
imports.  Traditionally, an exogenous rise in the demand for a country’s exports stimulates 
domestic output and raises income, which in turn boosts imports.  This relationship also holds in 
the presence of production sharing, but to the extent that exports contain imported components, a 
rise in export demand has a direct effect on imports. 
  This implies that imports are affected not only by changes in domestic income (in the 
traditional direct manner), but by changes in foreign incomes as they raise the demand for a 
country’s imported components needed to service the increased demand for exports. 
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This relationship is modeled very simply in equations (1)-(3), where Mexico’s demand 
for parts imports (M*parts) is a negative function of the real exchange rate (e) and a positive 
function of domestic income (YMX)  and exports of the finished product (Xpv).  The latter, in turn, 
are a positive function of the real rate and of U.S. income (YUS).  Substituting equation 2 into 
equation 1, yields equation 3, a result which gives U.S. GDP a new role in determining Mexico’s 
imports along with Mexico’s GDP.  In this setting, the coefficient on the real exchange rate may 
be negative, as in the traditional case, but it may also be insignificant or positive.  It will be 
positive as Mexican value-added in passenger vehicle exports to the U.S. rises. 
  We would thus expect network-related imports to behave differently relative to more 
traditional imports, where the key characteristic of such imports is that they are not destined for 
re-export. 
  In auto trade between the United States and Mexico, U.S.-made parts and components are 
imported by Mexico for incorporation into finished vehicles, which are then shipped to the 
United States.  Under normal circumstances, a depreciation of the peso against the dollar would 
be expected to raise the peso price of U.S.-made components and thus reduce demand.  The 
higher price of imported components raises the peso cost of the vehicle into which they are 
incorporated.  At the original exchange rate, this raises the dollar price of the vehicle.  But the 
decline of the dollar price of the peso acts as an offset.  The dollar price of the imported vehicle 
is pushed up by the increase in the peso price of components and pushed down by the 
depreciation of the peso.     20
  The net effect on the dollar price of imported automobiles depends on the share of 
Mexican value-added in those vehicles.   Mexican value added includes assembly and Mexican 
parts and components.  When parts imports are destined for use by Mexicans and vehicle exports 
consist entirely of Mexican value-added, peso depreciation reduces imports, raises exports and 
improves the trade balance.   
  As the share of imported components intended for incorporation into exports rises, the 
response of trade to peso depreciation weakens as compensating changes on the two sides of the 
trade balance tend to mute the effect.  To the extent that Mexico’s vehicle exports contain 
Mexican value-added, the dollar price of exports falls as a result of the peso depreciation.  This, 
in turn, raises the demand for vehicle imports from Mexico and thereby raises the demand for 
U.S.-made components.  There are two forces operating on parts imports, therefore.  On the one 
hand, the demand for parts for use by Mexicans falls, while the demand for parts to be 
incorporated into vehicle exports rises.  The net effect depends on the share of imports for 
domestic use and on the share of Mexican value-added in vehicle exports.  The response of 
imports to peso depreciation may thus be negative, positive or zero. 
  The foregoing helps explain the degree of pass-through of exchange-rate changes to 
domestic import prices.  The peso depreciation will be reflected in lower dollar prices of vehicle 
imports only to the extent of embodied Mexican value-added.  A simple view of this relationship 
may be sketched as follows. 
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where P* and P are prices expressed in pesos and dollars, respectively, E is the peso price of the 
dollar, λ is the share of imported parts in vehicle exports, and VA*  is Mexican value-added.  
Dollar prices of U.S.-made parts are assumed to be fixed.   
Thus production sharing adds a new explanation for the observed weakness or absence of 
pass-through.
 11 
  The decline in sensitivity to exchange-rate changes of some trade flows has implications 
for the choice of exchange-rate regime. If trade becomes less sensitive, then the buffer function 
of flexible rates becomes less important, but so does the claim that floating rates destabilize trade. 
                
5.  Concluding Remarks 
  The pros and cons of greater monetary cooperation in North America have received 
extensive attention in recent years.  The three countries in the region have taken steps toward 
closer economic integration through NAFTA.  They meet many of the basic pre-conditions for 
monetary union – not perfectly, but reasonably well.  They are each other’s major trading 
partners in most dimensions and their economies are strongly linked across goods, services and 
asset markets and to a lesser extent at the level of factor markets.   22
  Most empirical studies see gains from monetary integration, which tend to be easier to 
measure than the costs.  That is due in part to the fact that the cost of lost policy independence is 
difficult to assess. 
  While the debate over policy continues, de facto integration moves forward.  Among the 
more interesting developments in the past decade or so has been the rapid expansion of cross-
border production networks, both within the region and beyond.  The available evidence suggests 
that in the course of the process, cyclical and structural asymmetries among the countries are 
declining, thereby eroding a major argument against common currencies. 
  Furthermore, the evidence suggests that network-based trade tends to be less sensitive to 
variations in exchange rates, a result which reduces the importance of a floating rate’s buffer 
function. 
  These are developments, the thrust of which should further diminish the economic 
obstacles to currency union. But while the economic pre-conditions are positive, the political 
environment is quite hostile. The attitude in Washington is one of indifference, while popular 
opposition in Canada and Mexico is based on cultural and political considerations. This is quite 
the reverse of the conditions that prevailed in Europe, where the economic case was often less 




  An earlier draft was presented at the workshop in Vienna on “Regional and International 
Currency Arrangements,” sponsored by the Austrian National Bank and the Bank of Greece, 
February 24-25, 2006.  I am indebted to Steven Kamin and Pierre Siklos and to participants at   23
the Vienna workshop for valuable comments, to B.J. Dechsakulthorn and Maria Tzintzarova for 
valuable research assistance, and to Alex Huemer for useful discussions. 
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1.  For a detailed assessment of the options available to Canada, see Arndt (2003).     
2.  See, Mayes (2005), for example. 
3.  See, among others, European Commission (Emerson, 1990), Eichengreen (1997) and  
        Krugman (1993). 
4.  See, for example, Berg and Borensztein  (2000) and Hausmann et al. (1999).   
5.  In a recent study, Kunimoto and Sawchuk (2005) suggest that utilization of NAFTA hovers in 
        the neighborhood of plus or minus fifty percent, meaning that for a significant share of  
        intra-NAFTA trade the costs associated with MFN tariffs are lower than compliance with  
        NAFTA’s rules of origin. 
6.  Grubel (2000) has also been a forceful critic of Canada’s recent exchange-rate regime, but for 
        reasons that have more to do with hysteresis and the role of labor unions.   
7.  See Amano and van Norden (1993), Murray (2000), and Murray, Schembri and St-Amant 
        (2003), for example. 
8.  The main causal variables in this model are the inflation differentials and relative prices of 
        energy and non-energy products. 
9.  In this context, Austria’s experience with a fixed-rate system involving the German mark is 
        an extremely valuable case study (Arndt, 1982).  It is doubtful that Mexico is capable of 
meeting those 
        standards, in which case some version of a floating rate system is superior.  
10.  See, for example, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) and Torres and Vela (2003).   
11.  See, for example, Knetter (1993), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), and Krugman (1987). 
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Chart 1A: Manufactures Machinery and Transport Equipment NAFTA Imports 
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Chart 2A: Manufactures Miscellaneous Manufactures NAFTA Imports and Exports 
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Sven’s paper represents an interesting and informative discussion of some of the issues 
associated with the creation of a currency union involving the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  
(For convenience, I will be referring to this arrangement as NAMU, or North American Monetary 
Union.)  This union could be a formal arrangement such as in the euro area, or it could be an 
informal arrangement in which Canada and Mexico unilaterally dollarize.  The paper acknowledges 
that there is little political momentum for NAMU, in any of its variants, in the United States, 
Canada, or Mexico at present.  Nonetheless, Sven’s paper brings out some interesting issues 
associated with three such diverse economies accepting a common currency and monetary policy.   
Sven’s paper does not argue forcefully either for or against NAMU.  Instead, it reviews a 
subset of the arguments that have been made regarding monetary union.  It then develops one 
argument in detail–that the evolution of production-sharing arrangements has increased integration 
and made NAMU more advantageous.  In the end, it cautiously asserts that the three countries meet 
some of the basic conditions for monetary union, and that economic obstacles to such union are 
diminishing. 
In my remarks, I would like to first address the most articulated argument in Sven’s paper, that 
regarding production sharing arrangements.  I would then like to touch on some additional 
considerations: the behavior of Canadian and Mexican exchange rates; prospective economic 
performance under NAMU; and the gains from NAMU. 
Turning first to production-sharing, Sven appropriately highlights the importance of two-way 
trade in components in integrating the North American economies.  He argues that one consequence 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Christopher Gust and Martin Bodenstein for their work on the modeling simulations described 
in this paper, and Heidi Fischer and Philip Rescober for able research assistance.  The views expressed are my own 
and not necessarily those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff.    
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of production sharing is that it makes trade flows less responsive to exchange rates, so that giving up 
exchange rate flexibility for NAMU becomes less costly.  I do not find this point to be especially 
compelling.  Consider an example in which the U.S. initially produces its own automobiles (stage 1), 
and then starts exporting components to Mexico and importing assembled autos (stage 2).  I agree 
that trade in components and assembled products probably is less sensitive to exchange rates than 
trade in final goods.  However, in stage 2, the trade in components and assembled autos exists side-
by-side with trade in other, final goods that already existed before the advent of production-sharing, 
and which has nothing to do with production sharing.  The trade that has nothing to do with 
production-sharing is still as sensitive to exchange rates as it was before.  Therefore, increased 
production sharing may gross up the amount of imports and exports, and the sensitivity of these 
gross trade flows with respect to the exchange rate may be diminished.  However, it is not clear that 
the sensitivity of the trade balance or of economic activity in the two economies will be diminished, 
relative to the case in which no production sharing exists. 
I have much more sympathy with Sven’s related argument: that a consequence of production-
sharing is that shocks to any one economy are more likely to affect the other economies.  This causes 
business cycles to become more symmetric, thus lowering the costs of giving up exchange-rate 
flexibility and monetary independence. 
However, Sven does not make the case that in integrating business cycles in North America, 
production-sharing offsets other factors that have been pointed to as creating business-cycle 
asymmetries–for example, the greater importance of commodities to Canada and Mexico compared 
with the U.S. economy.  Therefore, it remains unclear whether or not, on balance, such asymmetries 
pose a substantial cost to NAMU. 
As a related point, Bank of Canada economists have been emphatic that changes in the 
U.S./Canadian exchange rate have importantly been driven by asymmetric shocks hitting the two 
economies, particularly relating to commodity prices–therefore, fixing the exchange rate would 
deprive Canada of an important adjustment mechanism.
2  In connection with this issue, it is 
                                                 
2 See John Murray (2000), “Why Canada Needs a Flexible Exchange Rate,” North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, vol. 11, pp. 41-60.  
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interesting to note that the U.S./Canada exchange rate and the U.S./Mexico exchange rate have 
behaved quite differently in recent years.  As shown in Exhibit 1, in recent years, a weakening of the 
U.S. dollar against the euro–shown as a rise in the number of dollars it takes to buy a euro–has been 
associated with a strengthening of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar.  This suggests, 
unsurprisingly, that shocks which lower the U.S. dollar against major currencies such as the euro 
lower the U.S. dollar against the Canadian dollar as well.  However, when the dollar has fallen or 
risen against the euro (Exhibit 2), the Mexican peso has moved in the same direction against the 
dollar, and quite systematically.  That is, when the dollar rises against the euro, the peso rises against 
the dollar and thus even more against the euro.  
It is not clear what accounts for the strange behavior of the peso.  One possibility is that the 
Mexican economy is highly dependent on the U.S. economy.  Therefore, positive shocks to the U.S. 
economy that boost the dollar, for example, portend even greater increases in Mexican growth, so 
the peso rises against the dollar.  These considerations, if valid, underscore the importance of 
exchange rates in stabilizing the economies of North American against asymmetric shocks. 
This discussion is admittedly quite abstract.  What would be the practical implications of 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States adopting a single currency?  Two of my colleagues at the 
Federal Reserve, Chris Gust and Martin Bodenstein, have used the Federal Reserve’s general 
equilibrium macro-model, FRB/Global, to simulate what might have occurred if Canada and Mexico 
had informally dollarized starting in 2001.  In this experiment, the Canadian and Mexican exchange 
rates are frozen against the U.S. dollar, and both countries are assumed to now face U.S. interest 
rates.  The U.S. fed funds rates is set by a Taylor rule that responds to U.S. inflation and U.S. output 
gaps.  The consequences, shown in Exhibits 3 - 8, are as follows: 
For Canada, instead of the large appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar that 
took place in reality, as indicated by the solid line labeled “actual” in Exhibit 3, the exchange rate 
implicitly would have stayed at its initial weaker level, indicated by the dashed line labeled NAMU. 
 Moreover, the level of interest rates would have declined to U.S. levels.  These two developments 
would have been destabilizing: GDP growth would have been boosted above its already robust 
performance in recent years, and inflation would have soared.  For Mexico, an even greater 
decline in interest rates (bottom of Exhibit 5, top of Exhibit 6) would have boosted the economy  
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initially, but that would have been offset later because under NAMU, the depreciation of the peso 
against the dollar that actually took place would not have occurred.  Therefore, GDP growth, while 
higher than baseline in the first two years of NAMU, would have fallen well below baseline 
thereafter.  Inflation would have been little affected over the period. 
Finally, as we might expect, given the relative sizes of the economies involved, the 
performance of the U.S. economy would have been little affected by the informal currency union, as 
measured either by GDP growth or the path of short-term interest rates (Exhibit 8). 
So the message of the model is that NAMU could be destabilizing because it shuts down 
important adjustment mechanisms in the economy.  But even if NAMU were less destabilizing, one 
question Sven’s paper does not fully address is why Canada and Mexico would desire to enter into 
such an arrangement.  Aside from lowering transactions costs, whose benefits are difficult to 
measure, a common reason cited for seeking currency union is to reduce inflation, interest rates, and 
macro volatility.  However, as shown in top panel of Exhibit 9, Canada’s recent performance, 
whether measured by inflation rates, nominal interest rates, or real interest rates, has been quite 
comparable to that of the U.S. economy.  
For Mexico, although spreads on dollar debt have fallen to low margins, inflation and 
particularly nominal and real peso interest rates remain above U.S. rates.  Nevertheless, the Mexican 
economy has shown clear progress toward disinflation in recent years (bottom of Exhibit 9, top of 
Exhibit 10).  Moreover, in the aftermath of the 1995 Tequila crisis, Mexico’s experiment with 
floating exchange rates has gone as smoothly as anyone could have reasonably hoped. 
In conclusion, Sven’s paper suggests, albeit without stating it explicitly, that the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico are on a course that will logically take them to monetary union.  I find that 
argument less convincing.  First, at least for now, it is unclear that the costs of moving to NAMU 
would be all that small.  Second, it is unclear that the gains from NAMU would be all that great.  In 
particular, both Canada and Mexico are enjoying relatively stable macroeconomic performance, and 
this diminishes the need for them to anchor to a strong currency such as the U.S. dollar.  With macro 
management in both countries not broken, it likely would not be a good idea to try to fix it.    
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U.S.: Short-term Interest Rate
Percent Exhibit 9
U.S. Canada Mexico
Core CPI Inflation 2.2% 1.4% 3.1%
(2005) 
Nominal Long-term Interest Rate 4.4% 4.0% 8.2%
(Jan. 2006)
Real Long-term Interest Rate 2.2% 2.6% 5.1%
(Jan. 2006)
Dollar Sovereign (EMBI+) Spread 0 -- 120bp
(Jan. 2006)
Indicators of Nominal Convergence
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  Sven Arndt has written a very comprehensive piece dealing with the pros and 
cons of currency union type arrangements in North American that highlights, among 
other issues covered, the differential forces that are at work in North America relative to, 
say, the recent European experience. Rather than trying to analyze the issues relying 
solely on the well-known optimum currency area criteria, Arndt instead points out that 
the forces of economic integration that are at work in North America are just as likely to 
be market driven as they are driven by government led policies that seek to deepen the 
ties between the major trading partners. By far, these market driven forces historically 
have originated in the manufacturing sector, although the Free Trade Agreement between 
Canada and the US has also greatly enhanced labor mobility between Canada and the US. 
The deepening of integration at the level of the service industry is also being driven by 
market imperatives. While there is no sign of movement to a common currency, or even 
the US currency, Arndt effectively suggests that this additional step for Canada, the US 
and Mexico, is the ‘final frontier’ of economic integration.  
  Arndt’s attempt to contrast the North American versus European attitudes toward 
common currency arrangement over the past few decades, are mostly right on the mark. 
However, it is useful to remind students of economic integration on both sides of the 
Atlantic that, in Europe at least, monetary cooperation was viewed as the most politically 
feasible way of encouraging both political and economic integration. In contrast, there is 
no comparable vision or even desire for political or monetary integration. Instead, 
markets and, later, politicians have felt it far more desirable to facilitate economic 
integration by permitting the free flow of goods and services across borders. 
  Since the paper covers a large number of issues I will restrict my comments to 
five points raised by the paper, as a means either to amplify some of the issues discussed 
by Arndt, or to cast some doubts on the strength of other arguments.  They are: the 
importance of an independent monetary policy, the current level of satisfaction with 
ongoing trade relations in North America, whether the European experience with 
Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact offer any lessons, the current state of pass-  44
through effects and their implications for the future potential for currency union, and 
regional business cycle asymmetries influenced by trade integration. To conserve space, I 
will focus attention on the Canada-US experience only.  
  Arndt cites the Bank of Canada’s research that purports to support the view that a 
floating exchange rate insulates the domestic economy against external shocks. As 
valuable as this research is, it does not necessarily provide convincing evidence about the 
relative advantage of the flexible regime against a regime that instead pegs the exchange 
rate, presumably in a gradual fashion as did the Europeans in anticipation of an eventual 
monetary union. Figure 1 draws on Siklos (2006). It shows the results of counterfactual 
experiments that attempt to estimate the impact of an exchange rate objective that would 
force Canada, and two other archetypical floaters, Australia and New Zealand, to 
eventually peg their exchange rate to their US counterpart. Any exchange rate objective 
delivers lower economic growth than the current floating regime. In contrast, Siklos 
(2006) shows that any inflation targeting regime, which must operate under a floating 
exchange rate, always produces relatively stronger economic growth (not shown). Since 
the effects are permanent, it is precisely this type of result that reinforces in the minds of 
North American policymakers, and the more public more generally, the clear benefits of 
exchange rate flexibility. 
  It is also sometimes alleged that, in spite of a floating exchange rate, the Bank of 
Canada follows lock step the policies of the US Federal Reserve. Figure 2 plots key US 
and Canadian interest rates, together with the exchange rate. There is visually little 
evidence that the Bank of Canada follows the lead of the US central bank. Hence, this is 
unlikely to be a convincing vehicle to push for increased monetary integration. 
  A more serious issue is the performance of existing trading arrangements, most 
notably NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) that North Americans have 
heralded as the model for the rest of the world to follow. As Arndt points out, the recent 
anniversary of NAFTA has allowed critics to raise growing unhappiness with the dispute 
resolution mechanism that was thought to be able to protect both economies against 
unfair economic practices and policies. But, in Canadians eyes, it is the US that has 
flagrantly ignored the dispute resolution panel’s decisions, despite being dominated by   45
Americans. Combined with what are thought to be high compliance costs, Arndt is right 
to call into question whether the much vaunted market driven North American economic 
integration model might be due for a reversal. However, even if this possibility exists, 
there is no evidence that European attempts at removing trade barriers have been any 
more successful. Indeed, it would have been useful for Arndt to briefly discuss the 
European experience in this connection. 
  The centerpiece of the European movement toward monetary union consist, first 
and foremost, of the Maastricht Treat and, secondly, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
How important is such rule making behavior? As shown in Table 1, which updates the 
same Table presented in Hochreiter and Siklos (2004), good conduct in fiscal and 
monetary policies need not rely on such agreements. Canada would pass the Maastricht 
and SGP conditions with flying colors. Instead, loss of reputation, and the force of 
financial markets, will do just as well. Of course, Canada is a small open economy and 
this must be factored into the analysis. Nevertheless, rules are not enough. There must be 
a genuine commitment to agree to policies that foster convergence. The original members 
of the euro area had this but it is open to question whether future members awaiting entry 
into the euro area will display the same level of commitment to such rules, especially the 
SGP. 
  Arndt asks whether the apparent reduction in pass-through effects in Canada, and 
elsewhere, effectively lowers the costs of monetary integration. While the answer is, 
possibly, in the affirmative the proximate reason for the reduction in pass-through effects 
is likely the success of the inflation targeting regime. Moreover, the reduction in pass-
through effects has taken place in a relatively benign macroeconomic environment. It is 
still useful to have the floating exchange rate regime for those types of shocks that will 
transmit through the Canadian economy. 
  An intriguing possibility, not fully developed by Arndt, is the impact of the strong 
degree of integration, especially in the manufacturing sector, on the coherence or lack 
thereof, in regional business cycles. Because integration tends to be vertical (i.e., North to 
South), that is, between Canadian regions and US regions there is scope for greater rather 
than fewer asymmetries across Canada as a result of the deepening of cross-border   46
trading arrangements. Although provincial real GDP data have a number of problems 
associated with them, Figure 3 provides a plot of real GDP growth for select provinces 
since the early 1980s. There is indeed a great deal of apparent asymmetry in real 
economic performance across provinces. Whether these differences have been 
exacerbated since the Free Trade Agreement in the late 1980s is an empirical question, 
but the data suggest another aspect of the debate over monetary integration that would 
likely be considered if policy makers chose to go the route of currency unification. 
  Arndt’s paper reminds us that the question of monetary and economic integration 
is perennially of interest to policymakers and the public. Ironically, whereas monetary 
integration may be the last frontier of economic integration for North America, there are 
ever present signs that the deep forces of economic integration might unravel if growing 
resentment over how NAFTA actually settles trade disputes are not addressed. At the 
same time the unqualified success of monetary union in Europe is about to face several 
important tests. Recent members of the European Union, who must eventually join the 
euro area, are balking at some of the restrictions of Maastricht and the SGP. In addition, 
there is the problem of managing a single monetary policy for 30 or more rather diverse 
members. Not surprisingly then, there are whispers of the possibility of an unraveling of 
the euro area. No doubt the issues covered in this paper will continue to prompt more 
research and reflection in future.   47




Note: Drawn from Siklos (2006). The bars show quarterly real GDP growth for Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, under three different assumptions about how quickly the 
nominal exchange rate of each of these countries converge to a pegged exchange rate as a 
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Note: Data are from www.bankofcanada.ca. The ‘Bank rate’ is the target overnight 








































Table 1. A Maastricht for Canada? 
 
Canada  INFLATION 
(CPI) % p.a. 
FISCAL 1 
(DEFICIT)  
% of GDP 
FISCAL 2 
(DEBT) 
% of GDP  
INTEREST RATE 
in %  
1998  0.9  0.5/1.0  64.9  4.89 































Note: Data update a similar Table in Hochreiter and Siklos (2004). See their paper for 
sources and details. The first deficit figure (under FISCAL 1) includes Provinces, the 
other is for the federal government only. The interest rate data refer to the long-term 
interest rate objective of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Note: Data are estimates of the rate of change in real Gross Provincial GDP for the 
Provinces shown. Data are from CANSIM II. The vertical bars omit two years of data 
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